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1. Introduction 
When introduced in 1981, 401(k) plans were expected to be supplemental plans, used in 
conjunction with a defined benefit (DB) pension or a traditional defined contribution (DC) 
pension.1  Increasingly, employees are provided pension benefits solely through a 401(k) plan.  
This development has raised concerns that 401(k) plans alone do not provide adequate financial 
resources in retirement.  This paper illustrates that moderate 401(k) contribution rates can lead to 
adequate income replacement rates in retirement for many workers; that adequate asset 
accumulation can be achieved using only a 401(k) plan; and that these results do not rely on 
earning an investment premium on risky assets.  Using Monte Carlo simulation techniques, this 
study also illustrates the investment risk faced by participants who choose to invest their 401(k) 
contributions in risky assets, or who choose to remain invested in risky assets rather than 
annuitize their account balance at retirement.  
Despite only having been in existence for 27 years – less than a typical working career – 
some analysts appear to have concluded that 401(k) plans are a failure.2  For example, Munnell 
and Sundén (2004, 2006) argue that the 401(k) is “coming up short” due to low participation 
rates, inadequate contributions, poor investment decisions, and individuals withdrawing money 
from their 401(k) when changing jobs.  A recent government report echoes many of these 
sentiments by noting, “… workers may receive limited or no contributions from their employers, 
spend accumulated savings prior to retirement, or choose not to participate in a pension plan at 
all, ultimately arriving at retirement with insufficient savings to support themselves” (GAO, 
                                                 
1 In U.S. Senate Committee on Finance (1986), the Committee states: “The committee also believes that excessive 
reliance on individual retirement savings (relative to employer-provided retirement savings) could result in 
inadequate retirement income security for many rank-and-file employees. In particular, the committee believes that 
qualified [401(k) plans] should be supplementary retirement savings arrangements for employees; such 
arrangements should not be the primary employer-maintained retirement plan.” See also Joint Committee on 
Taxation (1987), which includes similar language. 
2 See Tergesen (2008). 
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 2007).  In testimony before Congress, one academic proposed replacing 401(k) plans with 
Guaranteed Retirement Accounts, in part due to belief that 401(k) plan participants will not be 
adequately prepared for retirement (Ghilarducci, 2008).   
This paper focuses on the question of whether or not 401(k) plans can provide adequately 
for retirement given the modest contributions rates of many participants.3  Munnell and Sundén 
(2006) points to two facts to support the conclusion that contributions to 401(k) plans are 
inadequate: (1) few 401(k) participants contribute the legal maximum to a 401(k) plan ($15,000 
in 2006) and (2) the modal contribution rate is a 6 percent employee deferral plus a 3 percent 
employer match.  The proposition that 401(k)s are inadequate in Ghilarducci (2008) is based in 
part on the fact that a riskless portfolio has historically yielded a real return of 3 percent or less, 
and that such a low rate of return would require too high a level of savings to achieve adequacy 
(Ghilarducci , 2006, p. 126-127).  To assess the validity of these arguments, this study simulates 
realistic savings behavior combined with both riskless and risky investments.  In addition, Social 
Security benefits are fully integrated into the assessment of adequacy.  Despite noting the 
importance of Social Security and that “… evaluations of income security should consider total 
retirement income from all sources, not just DC plans” (GAO, 2007, p. 4), GAO (2007) largely 
ignores Social Security when evaluating the adequacy of retirement savings in DC plans. 
This study constructs representative earnings paths that roughly represent median 
earnings for workers with a high school degree, a bachelor’s degree, and a graduate degree.  For 
a given earnings path and marital status, individuals are assumed to follow a particular savings 
path.  There is no attempt to derive the optimal path for retirement savings or to define the exact 
                                                 
3 Other aspects of the critique of the 401(k) system have been addressed elsewhere.  For example, Brady and Sigrist 
(2008) show that neither the offering of pensions by employers nor the participation in pension by employees is 
randomly distributed across the workforce; instead, those most likely to have the ability to save and to be focused on 
saving for retirement are much more likely to be covered by a pension. Multiple studies have shown that most 
401(k) assets are preserved at job change and at retirement.  See, for example, Amromin and Smith (2003); 
Bershadker and Smith (2006); Holden and Reid (2008); Sabelhaus, Bogdan, and Holden (2008); and Vanguard 
(2008).  
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 amount of resources needed to adequately fund retirement.  Instead, this paper assumes saving 
behaviors that a priori seem reasonable to the author, and which are consistent with the observed 
behavior of 401(k) plan participants.  Income in retirement is assumed to consist of Social 
Security benefits and income derived from financial assets accumulated in a 401(k) plan.  
Replacement rates are calculated under various scenarios.  For example, replacement rates are 
calculated assuming: current-law Social Security benefits and reduced Social Security benefits; 
contributions are invested in a portfolio of TIPS and contributions are invested in a portfolio of 
corporate stocks and bonds; and, retirees purchase an annuity and retirees make systematic 
withdrawals from an investment account.  
 
2. Assumptions Used in the Simulations4  
The representative individuals in the simulations are assumed to be born on January 1, 
1966.  These individuals are age 40 in 2006, and reach their normal (Social Security) retirement 
age of 67 in 2033.  Earnings paths are constructed that roughly represent median earnings for 
workers with different levels of education.  For a given earnings path, individuals or married 
couples follow an assumed savings path.  Married individuals are assumed to be the same age as 
their spouse.  Retirement income is assumed to be derived from two sources: Social Security 
benefits and payments derived from assets accumulated in a 401(k) account.  Retirement 
adequacy is assessed using a replacement rate that compares potential consumption after 
retirement to potential consumption prior to retirement.  The relevant measure of pre-retirement 
potential consumption is calculated separately for renters and homeowners. 
 
                                                 
4 A technical appendix, available from the author upon request, explains in detail the construction of the 
representative earnings paths, the calculation of Socials Security benefits, the calculation of Federal and state 
income tax, and the method of stochastic simulations.  
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 2.1. Earnings Paths 
The representative earnings paths are anchored at the approximate median earnings of 
workers age 40 with a high school degree, a bachelor’s degree, and a graduate degree.   In 
addition, a fourth earnings path one-third higher than the median graduate degree is calculated.  
The series are plotted in Figure 1.  The names of the series reflect their origin: (1) HS-35K (high 
school graduate earning $35,000 at age 40 in 2006 dollars); (2) Col-55K (college graduate 
earning $55,000); (3) Grad-75K (worker with a graduate degree earning $75,000); and (4) Scaled 
Grad-100K (scaled graduate degree worker earning $100,000). 
 
2.2. Savings  
Table 1 summarizes the assumptions regarding the savings behavior used in the 
simulations.  All savings are assumed to accumulate within – and receive the tax treatment of – a 
401(k) plan.  The contribution rate assumptions are behavior that a priori seemed reasonable to 
the author and which are consistent with pension plan participation and as documented in Brady 
and Sigrist (2008) and with employee deferrals and employer contribution rates as reported in 
profit Sharing/401(k) Council of America (2008).  
Those with higher earnings contribute a higher percentage of earnings to the 401(k) plan 
and start contributing at an earlier age.  Similarly, because they have more earnings on a per 
person basis, single individuals are assumed to begin contributing at an earlier age than married 
couples with the same total earnings.  Contributions to 401(k) plans as a percent of earnings, 
inclusive of any employer match, range from 4 percent a year for married couples with HS-35K 
earnings to 10 percent a year for single individuals and married couples with Scaled Grad-100K 
earnings.  The age at which workers start contributing to a 401(k) plan ranges from 32 years of 
age for single individuals with Scaled Grad-100K earnings to 52 years of age for married couples 
with HS-35K earnings. 
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 2.3. Social Security Benefits 
Workers are assumed to work until normal Social Security retirement age, which is 67 
years of age in 2033.  Parameters for the calculation of Social Security benefits use either 
historic values (for 2006 and years prior) or are consistent with the Social Security 
Administrations’s (SSA) 2006 intermediate projection (Social Security Administration, 2006).  
Most parameters used in the calculation are indexed to wage growth, using the average wage 
index (AWI).  The SSA’s intermediate projection has average real wages growing by a steady 
1.1 percent a year after 2015, with nominal wage growth of 3.9 percent and inflation of 2.8 
percent.  The initial benefit is indexed to inflation in the years after retirement.  For each 
earnings path, I calculate three Social Security benefit levels: assuming the earnings are for a 
single individual; assuming the earnings are for a single-earner married couple; and assuming the 
earnings are for a married couple with each spouse earning one-half of total earnings (hereafter, 
“dual-earner married couple”).   
 
2.4. Owner-Occupied Housing and Mortgage Payments 
For homeowners, it is assumed that all individuals and couples: (1) purchase a home at 
age 35; (2) finance 100 percent of the purchase price using a 30-year fixed-rate mortgage 
charging a 7.0 percent rate of interest; and (3) pay off the mortgage at age 65.5  The purchase 
price of the home is assumed to vary by earnings path and is set (approximately) equal to the 
observed median purchase price in the second quarter of 2006, as reported by the National 
Association of Realtors (2006), in specific geographic regions.  In 2006 dollars, the purchase 
prices are assumed to be $300,000 for the Scaled Grad-100K earnings path (equal to the median 
purchase price of a home in the Northeast region); $230,000 for the Grad-75K earnings path 
                                                 
5 According to tabulations of the Federal Reserve Board’s 2004 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), of households 
with a household head age 65 to 74, 81 percent own their home; and, 60 percent of homeowners in this group, or 49 
percent overall, own a home unencumbered by mortgage debt. 
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 (median, all of U.S.); $190 for the Col-55K earnings path (median, Southern region); and 
$100,000 for the HS-35K earnings path (median, Buffalo, NY).  The real price of the house is 
assumed to stay constant, with the nominal price increasing at the rate of inflation.6  
 
2.5 Taxes 
Payroll taxes are the sum of two taxes: the Social Security or Old Age, Survivor, and 
Disability Insurance (OASDI) tax of 6.2 percent of earnings up to the annual earnings base 
($94,200 in 2006);7 and the Medicare or Hospital Insurance (HI) tax of 1.45 percent on total 
earnings.  Payroll taxes are applied only to earnings and do not effect disposable income after 
retirement.    
For Federal income tax, it is assumed that 2006 tax law applies.  That is, current law tax 
rates are applied in all periods, and the parameters of the tax code that are indexed are adjusted 
for inflation (without regard to rounding rules) in periods both before and after 2006.  Without 
loss of generality, state income taxes are calculated using the Virginia income tax. Adjusted 
gross income (AGI) while working is assumed to be equal to earnings less employee 401(k) 
contributions.  In retirement, AGI is set equal to distributions from the 401(k) account plus 
includable Social Security benefits.8 
 
                                                 
6 To check whether or not the assumptions regarding purchase price were reasonable, I calculated the percentage of 
pre-tax income represented by the sum of the total mortgage payment (both interest and principle payments) plus 
property taxes (assumed to 1.5 cents per dollar of value).  For HS-35K workers, mortgage payments plus property 
taxes represented 29 percent of pre-tax income in the first year of the mortgage and represented 13 percent of pre-tax 
income in the final year of the mortgage.  The corresponding numbers for the other earnings paths are: (1) 35 
percent and 15 percent for Col-55K earners; (2) 32 percent and 14 percent for Grad-75K earners; and (3) 31 percent 
and 14 percent for Scaled-Grad earners.   These ratios do not appear to be unreasonably high.  If it is thought that the 
purchase prices are too low, then calculated replacement rates for homeowners would be understated.   
7 For 2006 and prior years, historical earnings base numbers are used; after 2006, the earnings base is assumed to 
grow in line with SSA’s intermediate projection.  The earning base only affects the calculation of payroll taxes (and 
benefits) for singles and single-earner married couples with the Scaled-Grad-100K earnings profile, and even in this 
case only for a few years.  Specifically, this earnings path exceeds the earnings base only in the years 2004 to 2014. 
8 In the case of Virginia AGI, 100-percent of Social Security benefits are excludable. Forty-one states and the 
District of Columbia have broad-based personal income taxes.  Of these, 26 states and the District of Columbia do 
not tax Social Security benefits.  See Snell and Waisanen (2007).   
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 3.  Baseline Simulation Results: TIPS Portfolio Annuitized at Retirement  
 For the baseline case, contributions to a 401(k) are assumed to be invested in inflation-
indexed Treasury bonds, also known as Treasury inflation-protected securities (TIPS).  Yields 
are assumed to be 2.4 percent real, which, through most of the projection period, yields a 
nominal rate of 5.2 percent.9   
Upon retirement, it is assumed that the entire 401(k) balance is used to purchase an 
inflation-indexed immediate life annuity that provides an annual payment until death and adjusts 
the payment each year to account for changes in the cost of living.  Because the SSA’s 
intermediate projection assumes life expectancy at age 65 will increase 1.9 years for males and 
1.5 years for females between 2005 and 2035, annuity prices in 2033 for a 67 year-old are 
assumed to be equal to annuity prices in 2006 for a 65 year-old.  Married workers were assumed 
to purchase joint and 50-percent survivor annuities; that is, a surviving spouse would continue to 
receive one-half of the original annuity payment.10 
 
3.1. Accumulations and Distributions 
Table 2 reports the amount of assets accumulated by the time a worker retires and the 
amount of annuity income that the assets would generate.  Those with higher earnings are 
assumed to accumulate more in assets because they have higher earnings, contribute a higher 
proportion of their earnings, and begin contributing earlier.  Controlling for total earnings, single 
                                                 
9 As of October 30, 2006 the yield on 10-year TIPS was 2.39 percent.  The SSA’s intermediate projection includes 
an implied real rate of 2.9 percent after 2015.  However, the real return in the projection is calculated as the rate 
earned on debts held in the trust fund less current inflation; it is not a projection of the yield on a TIPS security.  For 
example, in 2005, the SSA’s real rate was 0.8 percent, but the 10-year TIPS yield was 1.8 percent.  Because I do not 
know the long run relationship between TIPS yields and SSA’s real interest rate, I use the current yield of 2.4 
percent in the calculations.  This is also, presumably, the real interest rate that is consistent with the real annuity 
prices discussed below.  
10 Pricing was obtained on 10/31/06 for an annuity with a single annual payment, with payments commencing one 
year after the initial investment, and with no guaranteed minimum payments or death benefit. The amount of annual 
income per $100,000 invested is $6,067 for single males, $5,440 for single females, and $5,250 for joint and 50-
percent survivor annuities.  (See  Uhttps://flagship.vanguard.com/VGApp/hnw/accounttypes/retirement/ 
ATSAnnuitiesOVContent.jspU.)   
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 individuals accumulate more because they are assumed to begin saving at an earlier age.  For 
married couples, assets at retirement (in 2006 dollars) range from $28,245 for HS-35K earners to 
$464,417 for Scaled Grad-100K earners.  For single individuals, assets range from $77,709 to 
$559,562.   
With their accumulated 401(k) assets, single males could purchase real annuities 
providing annual income ranging from $4,587 for those with the HS-35K earnings path to 
$33,032 for those with the Scaled Grad-100K earnings path.  Because females typically live 
longer than males, annual annuity payments for single females are 12 percent lower.  With less 
money to invest – both absolutely and on a per-person basis – married couples can purchase 
annuities with annual payments ranging from $1,455 for HS-35K workers to $23,919 for Scaled 
Grad-100K workers. 
 
3.2. Replacement Rates  
Pre-retirement potential consumption is calculated as average (from age 30 to 66) real net 
income.11  Renters’ pre-retirement net income is equal to earnings less taxes and savings.  
Homeowners’ pre-retirement net income is equal to earnings less taxes, savings, and mortgage 
payments.  For both renters and homeowners, net income in retirement is Social Security benefits 
and 401(k) distributions less any taxes, as it is assumed retirees no longer save and homeowners 
pay off their mortgage prior to retirement.12 
Results from the baseline simulations are presented in Table 3.  All reported dollar 
amounts are in 2006 dollars.  Because real earnings increase over time in the earnings paths used, 
                                                 
11 For a more thorough discussion of replacement rate measures, see Brady (2008). 
12 The measure of average income in retirement takes into account survival probabilities, and thus places greater 
weight on income received in the early years of retirement. For the baseline case, weighting by life expectancy has 
little effect on the measured replacement rate as gross income is constant in real dollars.  For more detail on the 
formula used, see Section 6.3.2 below.   
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 average real earnings for each series are higher than real earnings at age 40.  For example, for the 
Col-55K earnings path, average real earnings after age 30 are $58,306. 
Prior to retirement, the percentage of gross earnings accounted for by savings and taxes 
for single individuals ranges from 26 percent for HS-35K workers to 36 percent for Scaled Grad-
100K workers.  Holding total earnings fixed, married individuals have a lower reduction in 
income from savings and taxes, ranging from 18 percent to 30 percent.  For homeowners, 
mortgage payments, net of tax benefits, represent an additional 10 percent to 15 percent of 
average pre-retirement earnings.  All told, savings, taxes, and mortgage payments reduce pre-
retirement gross earnings, on average, from 30 percent to 46 percent.   
In retirement, annual Social Security benefits for single individuals range from $18,814 
for the HS-35K earnings path to $33,315 for the Scaled Grad-100K earnings path.  Social 
Security benefits for married couples range from $27,754 to $49,973, in real 2006 dollars.  In the 
case of single-earner married couples, benefits are higher than single individuals because the 
non-working spouse is eligible for benefits equal to 50-percent of the working spouse’s benefit.  
In the case of dual-earner married couples, benefits are higher because each spouse earns half the 
amount of the single individual, and the progressive benefit formula results in benefits that 
replace a higher proportion of earnings.  For example, for the Col-55K earnings path, single-
earner married couples would receive $39,187 annually and dual-earner married couples would 
receive $32,547 annually, compared to $26,124 for single individuals.   
Adding in the annual annuity income derived from 401(k) accumulations, annual gross 
income ranges from $23,077 for single females with HS-35K earnings to $69,863 for single-
earner married couples with Scaled Grad-100K earnings. 
For single individuals with HS-35K earnings, taxes in retirement are negligible, while for 
those that have Scaled Grad-100K earnings taxes represent about 15 percent of gross income.  
For married couples, taxes are negligible for those with HS-35K and Col-55K earnings, and only 
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 reduce income by 7 percent for those with Scaled Grad-100K earnings.  Reductions in gross 
income decline in retirement because (1) retirees do not save; (2) retirees do not pay payroll 
taxes; (3) income taxes decline; and (4) homeowners are assumed to have paid off their 
mortgage.  Income taxes are lower because: gross income is lower; because Social Security 
income is at least partially excludable from taxable income; and because of increased deductions 
and credits.   
Replacement rates for single renters range from 83 to 92 percent.  For married renters, 
replacement rates range from 83 to 102 percent of net income.  Replacement rates for single 
homeowners range from 98 percent to 108 percent.  For married homeowners, replacement rates 
range from 102 percent to 124 percent. 
 
4. Judging Retirement Resource Adequacy 
A starting point for judging retirement resource adequacy would be to assume that a 
retiree would want to replace 100 percent of his average real net earnings.  The results presented 
above suggest that most workers can achieve, or come close to achieving, this goal by 
supplementing Social Security benefits with income from a 401(k) plan, with moderate 401(k) 
contribution rates, conservative investments, and starting contributions at some point after 
reaching age 30.  However, 100 percent potential consumption replacement may not be the 
correct standard for adequacy.   
The adequacy standard may be below 100 percent consumption replacement.  First, there 
are work related expenses that may be eliminated or reduced in retirement.  Second, with more 
leisure time, retirees may substitute home production for market purchases.13 Third, consumer 
durables purchased prior to retirement may continue to provide services well into retirement or 
need to be replaced less often in retirement.  Perhaps most importantly, if workers raised children 
                                                 
13 See Hurst (2007) for a discussion of changes in consumption near retirement. 
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 while working, household expenses presumably would be lower if these individuals or couples 
are no longer supporting minor children in retirement.14 
The adequacy standard may also be above 100 percent consumption replacement.  The 
primary argument in favor of individuals needing more net income in retirement is that they may 
experience higher out-of-pocket health care expenditures.  This may be a factor both because the 
amount of health care services consumed by individuals likely increases in retirement, and 
because health care costs have tended to increase at a faster rate than general inflation. 
On balance, a consumption replacement rate at or below 100 percent is likely to provide 
adequate retirement resources, particularly for individuals who have raised children and 
particularly for lower income individuals, provided that Medicare and Medicaid programs 
remain in their current form.  However, even if out-of-pocket retiree health care costs increase 
markedly, it is not clear that the proper measure of 401(k) adequacy would be the extent to which 
it can fund both living expenses and health care costs, particularly if the resources needed to fund 
health care are a multiple of what would otherwise be needed to fund living expenses.  If, for 
example, the adequacy of 401(k) plans is judged relative to traditional DB pension plans, 401(k) 
plans do no better or worse than traditional DB plans in hedging medical expenses.  In addition, 
if rising retiree medical costs are a public policy concern, encouraging individuals to accumulate 
enough financial assets to self-insure against these risks may not be the optimal public policy 
response.  
 
5. Sensitivity of Baseline Results to Changes in Assumptions 
The simulations above require many assumptions, including assumptions about when an 
individual retires, the rate of return earned on savings, and the generosity of future Social 
                                                 
14 Scholz and Seshadri (2007) find that, controlling for lifetime earnings, children are an important determinant of 
household wealth. 
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 Security benefits.  An effort was made to make reasonable and defensible assumptions.  This 
section investigates how sensitive the simulation results are to these assumptions.  Table 4 
summarizes the sensitivity analysis. 
 If the individual or couple decides to retire at age 65 in 2031, two years prior to their 
normal retirement age, replacement rates are reduced by 9 to 15 percentage points.  For renters, 
early retirement results in replacement rates that range from 75 to 90 percent.  For homeowners, 
early retirement replacement rates range from 88 to 110 percent.  The results suggest that renters 
wishing to retire early may need to save more than assumed in the baseline scenario. 
Changes in real interest rates can affect the amount of assets accumulated at retirement as 
well as the price of the annuity purchased at retirement.15  The replacement rates for single 
individuals and higher earners are more sensitive to the rate of return assumptions because 
401(k) accumulations finance a higher percentage of retirement income.  For example, a 40 basis 
point change in the rate of return coupled with a change in the annuity payment of 10 percent 
changes the replacement rates of married couples with HS-35K by 1 percentage point.  In 
contrast, replacement rates of single individuals with Scaled Grad-100K earnings change by 
between 5 and 8 percentage points relative to the baseline assumptions. 
The baseline simulation assumes Social Security benefits are determined under current 
law.  If Social Security benefits are cut using “progressive indexing” starting in 2012,16 
replacement rates would be reduced by 1 to 13 percentage points.  Rates would range from 75 to 
95 percent for renters and from 90 to 110 percent for homeowners. A 28 percent across-the-
                                                 
15 The effect of short-run fluctuations in interest rates on annuity prices can be fully hedged by matching the cash 
flow of the bond portfolio to the expected payout of an annuity, and can be partially hedged by matching the 
duration of the TIPS portfolio to the life expectancy of the average annuitant.  To assess the effect of long-run 
fluctuations in the risk-free rate, a full stochastic analysis was not done because adequate historical return 
information on TIPS does not exist.  For example, the Federal Reserve Board’s H.15 release 
(Uwww.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/U) provides data on 10-year inflation-indexed U.S. Treasury securities 
beginning in 2003.   
16 This paper simulates the progressive indexing proposal described in Purcell (2005) and is explained in detail in a 
technical appendix, which is available from the author upon request. 
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 board cut in Social Security benefits would reduce replacement rates from 13 to 32 percentage 
points. Replacement rates would range from about 65 percent to 80 percent for renters and from 
about 75 percent to 90 percent for homeowners.  Such benefits cuts would necessitate higher 
rates of savings to achieve adequacy. 
 
6.  Stochastic Simulations 
This section uses stochastic simulations to illustrate the range of potential outcomes if 
401(k) plan contributions are invested in risky assets.  Specifically, Monte Carlo simulation 
techniques are used which assume that, in any given year, investment returns are a random draw 
from all possible investment returns.  Assets are assumed to be invested in a portfolio that is one-
half large corporate stocks and one-half corporate bonds, with the portfolio rebalanced annually.   
Data on investment returns for large company stocks and corporate bonds from 1926 to 
2004 were taken from Ibbotson Associates (2005).  Investments are assumed to be in mutual 
funds, with mutual fund expenses plus transaction costs equal to 120 basis points for stock funds 
and 70 basis points for bond funds.17  Real historical returns are calculated as nominal returns in 
a given year less inflation experienced that year.  Over the 1926 to 2004 period, the geometric 
mean real annual return for a portfolio with 50 percent large company stocks and 50 percent 
corporate bonds was 4.4 percent; the arithmetic mean real annual return was 5.2 percent; and the 
standard deviation of annual returns was 12.8 percent.   
For ease in exposition, the simulations presented above – which assume that 401(k) assets 
are invested in TIPs and that an immediate inflation indexed annuity is purchased upon 
                                                 
17 In 2005, the average 401(k) participant incurred an asset-weighted stock mutual fund fee of 76 basis points in total 
expenses and an asset-weighted bond mutual fund fee of 58 basis points (see Holden and Hadley, 2006).  These 
averages were increased to 120 basis points and 70 basis points, respectively, to account for both direct and indirect 
fund-portfolio trading expenses.  Direct trading expenses include payments to brokers, as either direct fees or 
bid/ask spreads.  Indirect trading expenses include the reduced price that a stock gets if large blocks of the stock are 
sold at a single time (for example, to meet cash flow needs due to share redemptions).  See Edelen (1999) for a 
discussion of these costs.  Intermediation costs are not restricted to mutual funds.  Because of transaction costs and 
the costs of other investment services, no investor earns the pure market rate of return. 
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 retirement – will be referred to as the “baseline case.”  Simulations that assume 401(k) assets are 
invested in a portfolio that is 50 percent large company stocks and 50 percent corporate bonds, 
rebalanced annually, with systematic withdrawals taken from the account during retirement, will 
be referred to as the “investment account.”  
 
6.1. Accumulation of Assets 
For a single simulation of investment returns, random real rates of return are generated 
for each year over a 47-year period corresponding to the time period over which a simulated 
individual is aged 20 to 66.  Nominal returns are calculated as the sum of real returns plus 
inflation.  Inflation is either historical inflation (before 2006) or as projected in the SSA’s 
intermediate projection (2006 and after).  Assumptions regarding savings behavior are the same 
as used in the baseline case and presented in Table 1.  A single simulation produces eight 
account balances at retirement, one for each possible combination of marital status and earnings 
path.  This process is then repeated 5,000 times to get a range of possible outcomes.   
Results from these simulations are presented in Table 5.  On average, over all 5,000 
simulations, the investment account outperforms the baseline case. Retirees who began saving at 
age 52 could expect to have 24 percent more in accumulated assets compared to the baseline 
case, and retirees who began saving at age 32 and would be expected to have 73 percent more in 
accumulated assets compared to the baseline case.  However, higher average returns are 
associated with higher risk.  In the highest ten percent of simulations, returns were substantially 
higher for the investment account than for the baseline case – with accumulated assets twice as 
high for those starting contributions at age 52 and nearly four times as high for those starting 
contributions at age 32.  In the lowest ten percent of simulations, the investment account 
substantially underperformed the baseline case, with accumulated assets 27 percent lower for 
those starting contributions at age 52 and 30 percent lower for those starting contributions at age 
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 32.  An alternative measure of the risk is the percentage of cases in which the baseline case 
outperformed the investment account.  This ranged from 28 percent of the time for investors with 
the shortest investment horizon to 18 percent of the time for investors with the longest 
investment horizon. 
 
6.2. Distribution of Assets 
The baseline case assumes that, upon retirement, all accumulated 401(k) assets are used 
to purchase an inflation-indexed annuity.  In contrast, the investment account is assumed to 
remain invested but with the annual distributions taken from the account.  Although bequests do 
not affect calculated replacement rates, for completeness it is assumed that any remaining 
account balance is left to heirs upon death of a single individual.  For married couples, it is 
assumed payments continue until the surviving spouse dies, with any remaining account balance 
left to heirs. 
6.2.1. Investment Account Payout Formula  
Annual withdrawals from the investment account are based on remaining life expectancy. 
Conditional on survival to age t, withdrawals from the account are equal to:18 
s
t
t
I
t L
A 11 ∗= −
I
t
1−tA
s
tL
                                                
W          (3) 
where  W  = withdrawal from the investment account (indicated by the superscript I) at time t; 
= account balance at age t-1 (i.e., Dec 31 of previous year); 
 = life expectancy conditional on surviving to age t, by gender/marital status;19 
s indexes the gender/marital status of the individual; 
 
 
18 This is essentially the formula used by the IRS to determine required minimum distributions (RMD) from IRAs 
and 401(k) plans (which must begin in the year after the beneficiary attains age 70-1/2.  Specifically, the balance as 
of January 1 determines the RMD for that year, and the distribution must be made by December 31.  The t subscripts 
in the formula represent end-of-year measures, so the withdrawal is based on t-1account balances (assumed to also 
be equal to the balance on January 1) and withdrawals take place at time t, that is, December 31 of year t.  
19 Life expectancy is taken from 2003 mortality statistics reported by the National Center for Health Statistics in 
Arias (2006). For married couples, the average of male and female conditional life expectancy is used. 
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 Account balances evolve in the following manner: 
 
I
tt Wr −+∗ )1(
))5.0(1( tr∗+
                                                
tt AA = −1         (4) 
 
where rt = rate of return earned on the portfolio at age t   
All who die in a given year are assumed to die in the middle of that year.20  Thus, in the 
event of the death of a single individual at age t, or, in the case of a married couple, in the event 
of death of the surviving spouse at age t, the amount of the bequest is calculated as: 
1tt AB ∗= −         (5) 
 
Because the life expectancy tables in Arias (2006) end at age 100, it is assumed any individuals 
surviving to age 100 die at the end of that year, with any remaining balance bequeathed to heirs. 
6.2.2. Comparison of Payment Streams  
Payouts from an investment account differ from real immediate life annuity payments for 
two reasons.  First, the payout formula is different.  Annuities pay a fixed amount until death, 
with no payments to heirs upon the death of the annuitant.  The investment account pays an 
amount that varies by age but, in the event of death, heirs get any remaining balance.  The 
second difference is the amount of investment risk.  A real immediate life annuity bears no 
investment risk, other than the risk that the insurance company cannot make the promised 
payments: as long as the insurance company remains solvent, the payment stream an annuitant 
will receive while alive is known with certainty.  Payments from the investment account are not 
known with certainty: they vary not only by age, but also depend on the investment returns of the 
risky assets held in the account.   
To separate out the effect of the payment formula from the effect of investment risk, this 
section first compares the payment stream from a real annuity to the payment stream from an 
 
20 Distributions from the account occur annually.  An individual dying the day after a distribution would have fewer 
assets to bequeath than an individual dying the day before a distribution.  The representative individuals in these 
examples are assumed to die in the middle of the year, which is roughly equivalent to what the average value of 
bequests would be from many individuals with deaths spread out over the entire year. 
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 account with no investment risk.  It then compares payments from a real annuity to payouts from 
an account invested in risky assets.   
Conditional on survival and reported separately for males, females, and married couples, 
Figure 2 plots the payment stream from $100,000 invested at age 67 (in 2033) in an inflation-
indexed annuity and from $100,000 invested at age 67 in TIPS that yield 2.4 percent real.21  A 
single male would receive a real annuity payment of $5,903 a year (the solid red line). 22  
Payouts from the TIPS account (the solid blue line) would equal $5,790 in the first year with 
payments increasing to $5,889 in the sixth year and then declining thereafter, falling under 
$5,000 at age 82 and under $4,000 at age 86.  Conditional on the survival of the annuitant, the 
annuity is able pay more in every period than the TIPS account.  This is because there is a risk of 
death and, in the event of death, payments cease.  For the average male, the solid green line plots 
the probability that a man alive at age 67 will be alive at later ages.  For example, there is a 51 
percent chance of surviving to age 82 and a 35 percent chance of surviving to age 86.  The 
dashed red line shows, for the average male, the expected payout from the annuity taking into 
account the probability of death.  For the TIPS account, the expected payouts are the same 
whether or not the individual survives.  This illustrates the trade off based on the payout method: 
conditional on surviving, the annuity pays more, but the expected payout is less.23 
The payment comparison is similar for single females, but both annuity payments and 
payments from the TIPS account differ from males because women typically live longer than 
                                                 
21 Provided bonds exist with sufficient amount of time to maturity, interest rate risk can be avoided by “laddering” 
the TIPS.  That is, by holding bonds with a variety of maturity dates, it would be possible to ensure that interest 
payments and proceeds from maturing bonds would provide enough cash flow to fund the payout stream without the 
need to sell any of the bonds in the secondary market. 
22 The quoted price for a $100,000 investment yielded a real annuity of $6,069 a year with payments commencing in 
one year.  After the first payment, subsequent payments are adjusted for inflation.  However, when measured in 
current dollars, and assuming 2.8 percent inflation the first payment is worth $5,903 ($6,069/1.028) because it 
occurs one year from the date of investment.  
23 An actuarially fair annuity would have the same expected payout as the TIPS account.  This is discussed in more 
detail below. 
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 men.  The annuity pays $5,292 a year in current dollars (the solid red line).24  Payouts from the 
TIPS account (the solid blue line) would equal 4,922 in the first year and increase to $5,296 in 
the tenth year before falling off.  Women have a 54 percent chance to live to age 85 and a 36 
percent chance to live to age 89 (the solid green line).  The annuity pays more in nearly every 
year, but the expected payout (the dashed red line) is less than the payout from the TIPS account. 
The payment comparison for married couples differs from the comparison for single 
individuals (the two bottom panels of Figure 2).  Conditional on both spouses surviving, the 
withdrawals from the TIPS account exceed joint annuity payments until age 79 (at which point 
the probability that both spouses are alive has fallen to 47 percent).  If one spouse dies and the 
other spouse survives, the real annuity payment is cut in half, but payments from the TIPS 
account continue using the same payout formula.  For survivors, payments from the TIPS 
account exceed the survivor annuity until age 91 (at which point the probability that one spouse 
is alive is 35 percent).  The dashed red line represents expected payments from the real annuity, 
and in both of the lower panels of Figure 2, it takes account both expected joint annuity 
payments and expected survivor annuity payments.  As with single individuals, total payouts 
from the TIPS account (withdrawals plus bequests) exceed expected payments from the real 
annuity.  However, unlike single individuals, there are many cases where the TIPS account pays 
out more than the inflation-indexed annuity even conditional on survival.  
Conditional on survival, Figure 3 compares the payment streams from a real annuity and 
from an account invested in risky assets.  As before, 5,000 simulations are run assuming the 
portfolio is invested 50 percent in stock mutual funds and 50 percent bond in mutual funds, with 
the portfolio rebalanced annually.  Ranking payment streams is more difficult than ranking 
                                                 
24 The quoted price for a $100,000 investment yielded a real annuity of $5,440 a year with payments commencing in 
one year.  After the first payment, subsequent payments are adjusted for inflation.  However, when measured in 
current dollars, and assuming 2.8 percent inflation the first payment is worth $5,292 ($5,440/1.028) because it 
occurs one year from the date of investment.  
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 accumulations, as both the timing and the total amount of payments are important.  To rank and 
evaluate payout streams, this paper borrows a measure of present discounted value (PDV) of 
withdrawals used by Dus, Maurer, and Mitchell (2005), which takes into account life expectancy 
as well as the time value of money, and is calculated as: 
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where  t = age  
= withdrawal from the investment account at age t  
Pr(alive)t = probability individual who is alive at age 67 is alive at age t 
r* =  risk-free rate of return (=5.2%; 2.4% real + 2.8% inflation) 
 
In each panel of the chart, the average payout by year is presented for the top and bottom 10 
percent of investment account simulation results ranked by the PDV of withdrawals (the light 
blue lines) and the middle 10 percent of simulations (the dark blue lines).  Thus, the shaded area 
approximates a 90 percent confidence interval for investment account payouts.  
For men (Figure 3, top left panel), average payouts from the investment account for the 
middle decile of simulations exceed real annuity payments from age 68 to age 86 (at which point 
the probability of survival is 35 percent).  Higher expected payouts are associated with more risk.  
In the top 10 percent of simulations, expected payouts from the investment account greatly 
exceed real annuity payments early on and do not fall below annuity payments until age 96.  In 
the bottom 10 percent of simulations, withdrawals from the investment account are below real 
annuity payments in all periods. 
The comparison of payouts for women (Figure 3, top right panel) is similar to the 
comparison for men.  Average payouts from the investment account for the middle decile of 
simulations exceed annuity payments from age 69 to age 92 (at which point the probability of 
survival is 24 percent).  But the payouts are quite variable, with the top 10 percent of simulation 
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 having much higher payouts and the payouts from the bottom 10 percent of simulations below 
the annuity payment in every year.  
The tradeoffs between an annuity and an investment are much different for a married 
couple (bottom two panels of Figure 3).25  Conditional on both spouses surviving, the average 
payout from the middle decile of investment account simulations exceeds joint annuity payments 
from age 67 to age 90 (at which point the probability that both spouses are alive is 6 percent) 
and, conditional on one spouse surviving, exceed survivor annuity payments from age 67 to age 
96 (at which point the probability of one spouse surviving is 13 percent).  As with the 
simulations for single individuals, there is a good deal of uncertainty surrounding payouts. 
However, for a surviving spouse, even payouts corresponding to the lowest 10 percent of 
simulations were higher than the survivor annuity payments from age 67 to age 88.  
6.2.3. Present Discounted Value Measures of Payment Streams 
The previous section presented visual comparisons of the payout streams from an 
immediate life annuity, an account invested in TIPS, and an account invested in risky assets.  To 
facilitate the comparison of these payment streams, this section summarizes the payment streams 
by using measures of present discounted value (PDV) used by Dus, Maurer, and Mitchell (2005), 
which take account of both the time value of money and the probability of survival.  The 
measure of the present discounted value of withdrawals was presented above.26  
In the case of the investment account, any remaining balance at the time of death is 
bequeathed to the heir.  Similar to withdrawals, the PDV of bequest is calculated as: 
 
                                                 
25 Both Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981) and Brown and Poterba (2000) illustrate that married couples typically would 
value actuarially fair annuities less than would single individuals.  
26 The PDV of withdrawal formula for annuities differs slightly from the formula for the investment account.  As 
noted in above, the life expectancy tables in Arias (2006) end at age 100.  For the investment account, it is assumed 
that any remaining balance at age 100 is bequeathed to heirs. For the annuity, the value of payments after age 100 
for those that survive to age 100 is estimated as the conditional life expectancy at age 100 (in years) multiplied by 
the annual annuity payment.  The value of payments after age 100 is included in the value of withdrawals and is 
assumed to be paid at age 100. 
Peter J. Brady December 18, 2008 20  
 ∑=
=
=  Bequest  PDV
t
t ( )( )−+
∗100
67
66*1
)Pr(
t
tt
r
dieB
I
t
A
t
A
tW
∗ )Pr( tt alive
( )( )
       (7) 
 
where  Bt = bequest at age t (defined in equation (5) above); and  
Pr(die)t = probability individual who is alive at age 67 dies after age t-1 and before age t 
 
Upon death, annuity payments cease and there are no death benefits paid. Thus, the PDV of 
bequests in the case of an annuity is always equal to $0.  
 To help quantify the risks involved in the various payout methods, Dus, Maurer, and 
Mitchell (2005) also develops a measure of shortfall relative to the amount of payment that 
would be received for an equivalent investment in an inflation-indexed, or real, annuity.  The 
measure is: 
Shortfallt  = 1 if W  < W        (8) 
     = 0 otherwise 
 
where = real annuity payment at age t  
 
To summarize the number of years that a shortfall would be expected for any individual, 
this study defines the shortfall count as:  
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To summarize the size of the shortfall when it does occur, Dus, Maurer, and Mitchell 
(2005) defines a measure of the PDV of the shortfall: 
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where  SFt = –  if W  < W   tW
I
tW
      = 0 otherwise 
 
Table 6 presents these measures for males, females, and married couples.  For males, the 
PDV of withdrawals (or payments) from a real annuity purchased for $100,000 is $73,438, with 
the PDV of withdrawals slightly higher for females and slightly lower for married couples.  
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 Payments cease upon death, so the PDV of bequests is $0. Annuities return less than a $1 in 
present value for every $1 invested primarily due to adverse selection: individuals who purchase 
annuities tend to live longer than the average person.  To account for this fact, financial 
institutions use annuitant life tables, rather than population life tables, to price the annuities.  The 
PDV measure uses life expectancy for the population as a whole; it represents the present value 
for the average person, not the present value for the average person who purchases an annuity. 
Total payments, inclusive of the PDV of bequest, are higher for the TIPS account. In fact, 
the PDV of total payments is exactly equal to $100,000.27  This is because the account earns a 
rate of return equal to the discount rate, and all assets are paid out as either a withdrawal or a 
bequest.  Focusing solely on withdrawals, the PDV of withdrawals for a TIPS portfolio is 10 
percent lower than a real annuity for males and 8 percent lower for females.  The TIPS 
portfolio’s PDV of shortfall conditional on a shortfall occurring is about $6,700 for men and 
about $5,700 for women.  Mortality risk imposes a tradeoff: for the average person, a real 
annuity offers higher expected payments for the annuitant, but the TIPS portfolio offers higher 
total payments (inclusive of payments to heirs). 
Again, it can be seen that the tradeoffs are different for married couples.  Not only is the 
PDV of total payments higher with a TIPS portfolio, but the PDV of withdrawals is higher as 
well.28  Simply pooling mortality risk within a couple provides expected withdrawals that are 21 
percent higher for the average couple than market-wide risk pooling in the presence of adverse 
                                                 
27 An actuarially fair annuity would also have a PDV of total payments of $100,000.  The ratio of the PDV of 
payments and the cost of the annuity has been referred to as the “moneys-worth” ratio (Mitchell, et al, 1999), and the 
extent to which the ratio falls below 100 percent measures the difference between the price of an actuarially fair 
annuity and a market-rate annuity.  It is of note that the literature has typically found a money’s worth of about 85 
cents on the dollar for nominal annuities.  This paper finds a much lower money’s worth for inflation-adjusted 
annuities than for nominal annuities.  This is presumably due to either more serious adverse selection in the case of 
real annuities or the inability of the insurer to completely hedge inflation risk using the pool of available TIPS 
securities. 
28 Both Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981) and Brown and Poterba (2000) illustrate that married couples face different 
incentives to annuitize than do single individuals.  
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 selection.29  There are still some risks, as it is expected that TIPS withdrawals will be less than 
annuity payments is 9.4 years.   However, for married couples the TIPS portfolio’s PDV of 
shortfall conditional on a shortfall occurring is only about $2,600. 
Invested in risky assets, the investment account earns, on average, much higher returns 
than TIPS.  Per $100,000 invested, the expected PDV of total payments ranges from just under 
$130,000 for men to over $138,000 for married couples.  In all cases the expected PDV of 
withdrawals exceed that of the real annuity.  Withdrawals are expected to fall below that of a real 
annuity in 2.6 years for women, 2.0 years for men, and 0.2 years for married couples. 
Conditional on a shortfall occurring, the PDV of shortfall is under $1,000 for males and females, 
and under $100 for a married couple.  Again these higher average returns entail more risk: in the 
lowest 10 percent of simulations, the PDV of total payments from a $100,000 investment is 
under $75,000 for males, females, and married couples.  
 
6.3. Replacement Rates in Retirement: Combining Accumulation and Distribution 
This section combines the simulation results from the accumulation phase and the 
distribution phase – as well as the calculation of Social Security benefits and taxes – to compare 
net income streams in retirement for each of the simulated individuals and couples.  Again, 5,000 
simulations are run, with each simulation run from age 22 to age 100. 
6.3.1. Net Income Streams 
For workers with HS-35K earnings, Figure 4 plots net retirement income conditional on 
survival for the baseline case and for the top, middle, and bottom deciles of simulations for the 
investment account.  The shaded area represents an approximate 90 percent confidence area for 
possible results from the investment account. Results are plotted for single men, single women, 
                                                 
29 These calculations assume that spouses’ mortality risks are not correlated. 
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 married couples with both members surviving, and for surviving spouses in the case where only 
one spouse is alive.   
For single males with HS-35K earnings, the average net income for the middle decile of  
investment account simulations is higher than the baseline case until age 91, when likelihood of 
survival is 16 percent, and higher for single females until age 96, when survival probability is 10 
percent.  Again, this higher median return comes with risk, as actual payments can be higher or 
lower.  However, the overall risk is fairly low, as Social Security benefits provide a floor beneath 
which net income cannot fall.  Average net income for the top decile of investment account 
simulations is 127 percent of the baseline case at age 67, rises to 156 percent at age 81, and does 
not fall below the baseline case until age 98.  For women, the top decile of simulations shows a 
similar pattern of net income, although net income remains higher than the baseline case even at 
the end of the simulation.  For men, average net income for the bottom decile of simulations is 
96 percent of the baseline case at age 67, falling to 82 percent by age 100. For women, it is 95 
percent of the baseline case at age 67 and falls to 85 percent at age 100. 
In the case of married couples with HS-35K earning where both spouses are surviving, 
the relative performance of the investment account and the baseline case are similar, but, because 
Social Security benefits make up an even larger proportion of retirement income, the total 
amount of risk associated with the investment account is much less.  Average net income for the 
middle decile of investment account simulations is higher until age 93, when there is a 2 percent 
chance that both spouses are alive.  As a percent of net income in the baseline case, the range of 
possible results from the investment account is much lower than is the case for single 
individuals, ranging as high as 117, but no lower than 95 percent. 
When a spouse dies, the surviving spouse has less net income than the couple. In the 
baseline case, net income for the surviving spouse is lower for two reasons.  First, Social 
Security benefits are reduced by one-third for single-earner couples (from 150% of calculated 
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 benefits of the working spouse to 100%), and reduced by one-half for dual earner couples (the 
surviving spouse continues to get his or her own benefit, but does not get the spouse’s benefit).  
Second, payments from the annuity are cut in half because it is assumed that the annuity is a 
joint-and-50-percent-survivor annuity.  In the case of the investment account, Social Security 
benefits are exactly the same as the baseline case, but payments from the investment account 
continue unchanged until both spouses die.   
In the case of married couples with HS-35K earnings where only one spouse is surviving, 
the investment account performs even better relative to the baseline case than it does for single 
individuals and married couples where both individuals are surviving.  Median net income from 
the investment account is higher than the baseline case until age 98, when the chance of one 
spouse surviving is 8 percent.  However, in contrast to other cases, the average net income of the 
lowest decile of simulations is higher than baseline case from age 67 to age 90, and never falls 
below 96 percent of the baseline case.  
Figure 5, Figure 6, and Figure 7 plot the same net income streams for Col-55K earners, 
Grad-75K earners, and Scaled-Grad 100K earners, respectively.  As with HS-35k earners: (1) the 
average net income from the investment account for the middle decile of simulations is higher 
than the baseline case until retirees are in their mid-to-late 90s; (2) married couples with an 
investment account have less overall risk than single individuals because more of their income is 
from Social Security benefits; (3) the ratio of net income from the investment account to net 
income from the baseline case is higher for married couples with one surviving spouse than for 
all other cases.  
As lifetime earnings increase, the main difference in the investment account simulations 
relative to the baseline case is that, as a percent of net income, both the rewards and the risks of 
the investment account are increased. This is because, as lifetime earnings increase, Social 
Security benefits become a smaller portion of income and distributions from 401(k) accounts 
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 become a larger portion of income.  For a single male with Col-55K earnings, average net 
income for the middle decile of investment account simulations peaks at 118 percent of the 
baseline case net income and average net income for the top decile peaks at 176 percent of the 
baseline case.  For a single male with Scaled Grad-100K earnings, the same ratios peak at 131 
percent and 273 percent, respectively.  The risk of shortfall also increases with earnings.  
Average net income for the bottom decile of investment account simulations falls to 77 percent 
at age 100 for a single male with Col-55K earnings, compared to 63 percent at age 100 for a 
single male with Scaled Grad-100K earnings.  Again, married couples face lower risks as a 
percent of the baseline case net income.  For example, even for the bottom decile of simulations 
the ratio of average net income from the investment account to net income from the baseline case 
never falls below 85 percent for the surviving spouse of a one-earner married couple, regardless 
of lifetime earnings. 
6.3.2. Replacement Rate Measures  
As discussed in Section 3, the replacement rate measures average real net income in 
retirement as a percentage of average real net income prior to retirement (from age 30 to 66). The 
measure of average real net income in retirement takes into account survival probabilities, and 
thus places greater weight on income received in the early years of retirement. Specifically, the 
formula is: 
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where B = real Social Security benefit  
S = real income from accumulated savings  
T = real federal and state income taxes  
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 For single renters and homeowners, Table 7 reports replacement rate measures for the 
baseline case and the investment account.  The replacement rates for females are slightly lower 
than for males in all cases because females have longer live expectancy, decreasing both annuity 
payments and the rate at which assets are distributed from the investment account.  The 
investment account produces higher expected replacement rates than the baseline case.  For 
example, the expected replacement rate for single male renters with HS-35K earnings is 98 
percent for the investment account, compared to 87 percent in the baseline case.  However, the 
investment account involves risk and, for the bottom decile of simulations, the expected 
replacement rate for this individual is 81 percent.  As illustrated above, higher earners are subject 
to more risk with the investment account.  For the bottom decile of simulations, the expected 
replacement rate for a single male with Scaled Grad-100K earnings is 79 percent, relative to 86 
percent in the baseline case.  
Table 8 reports replacement rates for married couples when both spouses survive.  
Because distributions from 401(k) plans are a smaller portion of their total retirement income, 
the investment account generates less variance in replacement rates for married couples.  For 
example, even in the lowest decile of simulations, the investment account averages a 
replacement rate of 87 percent for dual-earner married renters with HS-35K earnings, compared 
to an 88 percent replacement rate in the baseline case.  For dual-earner married renters with 
Scaled Grad-100K earnings, the lowest decile of investment account simulations averages a 
replacement rate of 91 percent, compared to 94 percent for the baseline case. 
Table 9 presents results for married couples when only one spouse survives.  Relative to 
the baseline case, the investment account offers surviving spouses much higher average returns 
and less risk than for either single individuals or married couples when both survive. For 
survivors, even the worst ten percent of investment account simulations produces a higher 
average replacement than does the baseline case. 
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 6.4 Discussion of Stochastic Simulation Results 
The stochastic simulations illustrate investment risk by showing a range of potential 
outcomes.  The simulations should not be used to assess adequate retirement savings.  The 
amount of savings deemed adequate ex ante should not vary with the type of investment chosen.  
The amount an individual decides to contribute to a 401(k) should be determined assuming that 
the investments will earn the risk-free rate of return and assuming that an annuity is purchased at 
retirement.  The portfolio allocation of the 401(k) account is a separate decision and should be 
based on the individual’s assessment as to whether or not the higher expected returns of a given 
investment compensate for any additional risk.   
Ex ante a dollar invested in corporate stocks or corporate bonds is worth the same as a 
dollar invested in TIPS.  Thus, ex ante, asset allocation should not affect the rate of savings 
deemed to be adequate.  Ex post a dollar invested in corporate stocks or corporate bonds could be 
worth more or less than a dollar invested in TIPS. The actual returns realized will cause 
individuals invested in risky assets to adjust future behavior.  
The higher expected rate of return on risky assets should not cause those invested in 
corporate equities or corporate bonds to plan on saving less than those investing in TIPS.  The 
popular financial press often treats investment risk as the solution to an equation comparing 
savings and the amount resources “needed” in retirement.  That is, it is often implied that an 
investor should first determine the rate of return needed, and then pick investments with that 
average return (and associated level of risk). For example: 
“Richard needs average gains of 8% over 10-1/2 years on his Roth IRA, 401(k) and other 
investments to [finance his retirement goals].  … [A financial planner] thinks he should 
be willing to take on more risk in hopes of boosting his returns.” (Marantos, 2002) 
 
Peter J. Brady December 18, 2008 28  
 This line of reasoning is incorrect.  If there is a mismatch between saving rates and asset 
accumulation goals, either savings rates or goals need to be adjusted. The level of risk in a 
portfolio should not be affected by these calculations.  
Assessing the savings needs of a 401(k) plan participant is analogous to determining the 
present discounted value of future liabilities for a defined benefit pension plan.  Traditional 
methods of pension accounting varied the discount rate for valuing future pension liabilities with 
the type of assets used to fund the pension.  That is, if the pension fund was invested in equities, 
future liabilities would be discounted at the average return of equities; if it was invested in 
bonds, future liabilities would be discounted at the average return of bonds.  Investment risk was 
not factored in.  Financial economists objected to this method, arguing that all liabilities should 
be discounted at the risk-free rate of return, regardless of the asset allocation of the pension fund.  
Discounting future liabilities at differential rates based on asset allocation leads to the illogical 
conclusion that a dollar invested in stocks was worth more than a dollar invested in bonds.  
Similarly, an individual should not assume that investing in risky assets is a way to reduce the 
amount needed to save for retirement in a 401(k).   
However, just as a dollar invested in a risky asset should not be valued more than a dollar 
invested in a safe asset, neither should it be valued less.  Ex ante, a voluntary rational decision to 
invest in risky assets cannot make an investor worse off than investing in the safe asset.30  
Willingly taking on risk implies that an investor prefers adjusting future consumption to account 
for actual realized returns to having the (certain) consumption path associated with the risk-free 
investment.   
Although not explicit, some recent studies seem to suggest that investors who choose 
riskier portfolios require more savings.  For example, VanDerhei (2006) concludes that 
                                                 
30 If the individual does not have enough information to rationally choose, it would be appropriate for the state to 
provide the necessary information or to provide investor education.  If the individual is incapable of making a 
rational decision, it would be appropriate for the state to make the decision for the individual. 
Peter J. Brady December 18, 2008 29  
 investment in equities and a lack of annuitization can lead to higher required “initial retirement 
wealth,” or a higher “necessary replacement rate.”  Ernst & Young (2008) illustrates that those 
without guaranteed lifetime income need to reduce their standard of living to insure that they 
have only a 5-percent probability of outliving their assets.  These studies imply that, ex ante, a 
dollar invested in risky assets is worth less than a dollar invested in the risk-free asset.   
In addition to providing no additional insight regarding adequate savings rates, the 
stochastic simulation results cannot, by themselves, indicate whether an individual “should” 
invest in the riskless asset or “should” invest in risky assets.  To make that determination 
requires information on the individuals’ preferences, including tolerance for risk and desire to 
leave bequests, and the individual’s beliefs regarding life expectancy and future market returns.  
Nonetheless, the results suggest some insights into which individuals would be more or less 
likely to take on investment risk. 
First, perhaps counter-intuitively, the simulations in this paper suggest that workers with 
lower lifetime earnings would be the most inclined to invest in risky assets and the least likely to 
voluntarily purchase an annuity in retirement, all else equal.31  This is because most of their 
wealth is in the form of an inflation-protected annuity (future Social Security benefits), making 
401(k) assets a smaller portion of wealth and making any risks incurred in 401(k) investments 
smaller as a percentage of retirement income. 
Second, because of asymmetric information and adverse selection, annuities offered in 
the private insurance markets will not be actuarially fair for the average individual.  This is 
illustrated by the fact that the PDV of payments produced by a dollar invested in an annuity is 
less than a dollar.  Because annuities bought in the private market are not actuarially fair for the 
average individual, the cheapest way to increase annuity income in retirement is to delay 
                                                 
31 “All else” includes risk tolerance.  For example, if risk tolerance increases with income or wealth, all else would 
not be equal.  In this case, lower-income households would not necessarily be more likely to invest in risky assets.  
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 claiming Social Security benefits.  Social Security benefits can be claimed as early as age 62, 
but, if initial receipt of benefits is delayed, benefits are increased using actuarially fair 
adjustments until the individual attains age 70.  If a portion of retirement assets are earmarked 
for the purchase of an annuity in the private marketplace, it would be better to use those assets to 
fund retirement consumption and delay claiming Social Security benefits until the assets were 
exhausted or age 70, whichever comes first.32 
Third, the simulation results also show that married couples face a different trade-off than 
single individuals when choosing to annuitize their wealth.  Even if annuity prices are not 
actuarially fair for the average individual, individuals may prefer an annuity if they only value 
payments they receive and place no value on payments made to heirs.  For single individuals, 
conditional on survival, the expected payout from a dollar invested in a real annuity is greater 
than the expected payout from a dollar invested in a portfolio of TIPS securities.  However, for 
married couples, the ranking of expected payouts conditioned on survival are reversed.  In 
addition, the investment account is relatively more attractive to the surviving spouse.  As most 
individuals approaching retirement are married,33 these facts may help explain the “puzzle” of 
few individuals choosing to annuitize their wealth at retirement.34 
The simulations illustrate both the higher average returns and the variance of those 
returns when investing in corporate equity and bonds.  An important caveat is that the variance 
that is modeled is across time periods rather than across individuals.  That is, the simulations do 
not illustrate that some individuals will experience better investment returns than others.  The 
simulations assume all individuals are invested in the same investment portfolio; thus, there is no 
                                                 
32 An alternative option is discussed in Novack (2008).  Under current law, an individual can claim Social Security 
benefits, but then repay the benefits, without interest, and restart benefits at a later age with the higher level of 
benefits. 
33 For example, Brady and Pierce (forthcoming) find that, of taxpayers aged 55 to 70 who do not receive Social 
Security benefits, 72 percent are married. 
34 As noted above, Both Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981) and Brown and Poterba (2000) illustrate that married couples 
face different incentives to annuitize than do married couples.  
Peter J. Brady December 18, 2008 31  
 variance in returns across individuals.  However, depending on the time period one invests over, 
the entire market would experience different rates of investment returns.  Thus, all workers 
retiring in a given year would either have experienced historical returns that were above average, 
average, or below average.  To the extent that individuals investing over the same time period 
experience different rates of return, it would represent an additional source of variation, and that 
source of variation is not modeled.  
 
7.  Conclusion 
Some analysts have concluded that, with typical contribution rates and without 
investments in risky assets, 401(k) plans cannot provide retirees with adequate resources.  To 
assess these claims, this paper uses simulations to calculate the amount of retirement income that 
could be generated by 401(k) participants with different levels of earnings using realistic 
assumptions of participant behavior, and to illustrate the amount of income that can be generated 
from both riskless and risky investments.  Annuities are priced using actual market prices rather 
than assuming that actuarially fair annuities exist.  Investment returns on risky assets account for 
investment fees, rather than assuming that the market return is available without any transaction 
costs.  The simulations incorporate Social Security benefits and the replacement rate measures 
used to assess adequacy account for taxes and savings and are calculated for both renters and 
homeowners.  
This study constructs representative earnings paths for individuals and married couples 
that roughly represent median earnings for workers with a high school degree, a bachelor’s 
degree, and a graduate degree; and a fourth earnings path is created that is one-third higher than  
median graduate degree earnings.  Depending on earnings, assumed total contributions rates to 
the 401(k) account, including employer contributions, range from 4 percent of earnings to 10 
percent of earnings.  Contributions to the account begin at age 32 to the highest earners and at 
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 age 52 for the lowest earners.  Income in retirement consists of Social Security benefits and 
income generated by the 401(k) plan account.   
In the baseline case, it is assumed that 401(k) participants invest in TIPS securities that 
provide a real yield of 2.4 percent and, at the time of retirement, use accumulated assets to 
purchase an annuity in the private market.  For single individuals who rent, net income in 
retirement replaces about 85 to 90 percent of net pre-retirement income.  Homeowners have 
higher replacement rates for net earnings because it is assumed that they pay off their mortgage 
prior to retirement and do not need to replace pre-retirement income used to pay mortgage 
principle and interest.  For single individuals who are homeowners, net income in retirement 
replaces about 100 to 110 percent of net pre-retirement income.   Because they get higher Social 
Security benefits controlling for total earnings, married couples achieve even higher replacement 
rates.  For married renters, replacement rates range from about 90 to 100 percent, and for married 
homeowners, from about 100 to 115 percent.  Thus, for most workers, moderate 401(k) 
contribution rates can lead to adequate income replacement rates in retirement, and this result 
does not rely on earning an investment premium on risky assets.   
Investment in risky assets increases the expected return of investments.  For example, 
with baseline assumptions, a single female with earnings comparable to median earnings for 
workers with a bachelor’s degree would replace 87 of pre-retirement net income in retirement.  If 
she instead invested in risky assets, she would expect to increase her net income in retirement by 
nearly 20 percent.  Associated with the higher average returns, these investments subject the 
participant to risks.  However, because Social Security provides the bulk of most individual’s 
retirement income and represents a floor beneath which retirement income cannot fall, the risk as 
a percentage of total retirement assets is not as large as would be suggested by examining the 
401(k) plan distributions separately.  For example, even if this individual experienced the 
investment returns of the bottom decile of simulations, her net income in retirement would be 95 
Peter J. Brady December 18, 2008 33  
 percent of the baseline case at age 67, not fall below 90 percent of the baseline case until age 92 
(when the probability of survival would be 20 percent), and would be 85 percent at age 100 
(when the probability of survival would be 3 percent).  
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 Table 1:  Savings Behavior Assumptions by Earnings Path and Marital Status 
Earnings 
Path  
Single Married 
Age start 
savings 
Savings as percent of 
earnings
Age start 
savings
Savings as percent of 
earnings
HS-35K 42 6% 
(6% employee; 
0% employer)
52 4%
(4% employee; 
0% employer)
Col-55K 42 9%
(6% employee; 
3% employer)
47 6%
(4% employee; 
2% employer)
Grad-75K 32 9%
(5% employee; 
4% employer)
37 9%
(5% employee;
 4% employer)
Scaled 
Grad-100K 
32 10%
(5% employee; 
5% employer)
37 10%
(5% employee; 
5% employer)
Source: Author’s assumptions 
 
 
Table 2: 401(k) Asset Accumulation and Annuity Income in Baseline Simulation: Certain 
Investment Returns1 
Marital Status 
Earnings Path 
HS-35K Col-55K Grad-75K 
Scaled Grad-
100K
401(k) Balance at Retirement (2006$)
Single $77,709 $188,867 $377,704 $559,562
Married 28,245 96,160 313,481 464,417
Real Annuity (2006 $)
Single Male $4,587 $11,149 $22,297 $33,032
Single Female 4,263 10,362 20,722 30,699
Married  1,455 4,953 16,146 23,919
Source: Author’s calculations 
1 Assumes savings are invested in inflation-indexed bond earning 2.4% real; inflation rates taken from history and 
Social Security Administration’s Intermediate Projection.  At retirement, real annuity purchased, with pricing for 
annuity taken from Vanguard’s annuity website on October 31, 2006.  Assumes single individuals by single life 
annuity and married individuals buy Joint and 50% Survivor annuity. 
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Table 3: Results From Baseline Simulation: Certain Investment Returns 
  Earnings Path 
  HS-35K Col-55K Grad-75K 
Scaled 
Grad-100K
WORKING 
Average Real Pre-Tax Earnings (over age 30, 2006$)  
All Cases $36,219 $58,306 $77,156 $102,874
Average Real Earnings After Tax and Savings (2006$) 
Single $26,850 $40,227 $51,005 $65,646
Married 1-Earner 29,434 44,688 56,644 72,250
Married 50/50 Earners 29,643 44,953 56,909 72,446
Average Real Earnings After Tax, Savings, and Mortgage (2006$) 
Single $22,522 $33,080 $42,693 $55,439
Married 1-Earner 24,897 36,399 46,845 60,590
Married 50/50 Earners 25,106 36,644 47,084 60,737
RETIREMENT 
Annual Social Security Benefit (2006 $)
Single $18,814 $26,124 $29,250 $33,315
Married 1-Earner 28,221 39,187 43,875 49,973
Married 50/50 earners 24,754 32,547 39,214 48,342
Average Real Benefit plus Annuity (2006$)
Single Male $23,401 $37,274 $51,546 $66,347
Single Female 23,077 36,486 49,972 64,015
Married 1-Earner 29,676 44,139 60,020 73,892
Married 50/50 Earners 26,209 37,500 55,359 72,261
Average Real Benefit plus Annuity After Tax (2006$)
Single Male $23,392 $35,680 $46,096 $56,150
Single Female 23,071 35,068 45,206 54,517
Married 1-Earner 29,676 44,139 58,064 69,390
Married 50/50 Earners 26,209 37,500 53,683 67,863
REPLACEMENT RATE
Renters 
Single Male 87% 89% 90% 86%
Single Female 86 87 89 83
Married 1-Earner 101 99 103 96
Married 50/50 Earners 88 83 94 94
Homeowners 
Single Male 104% 108% 108% 101%
Single Female 102 106 106 98
Married 1-Earner 119 121 124 115
Married 50/50 Earners 104 102 114 112
Source: Author’s calculation 
1 Assumes savings are invested in inflation-indexed bond earning 2.4% real; inflation rates taken from history and 
Social Security Administration’s Intermediate projection.  At retirement, real annuity purchased, with pricing for 
annuity taken from Vanguard’s annuity website on October 31, 2006 
 Table 4: Sensitivity of Baseline Simulation Results to Changes in Assumptions1
Replacement Rate by Earnings Path and Difference from Baseline Simulation    
Renters Home Owners 
  HS-35K Col-55K Grad-75K Scaled Grad HS-35K Col-55K Grad-75K Scaled Grad 
Rate  Diff Rate Diff Rate Diff Rate Diff Rate Diff Rate Diff Rate Diff Rate Diff 
Retire at Age 65                               
Single Male 75% -12% 77% -11% 80% -10% 76% -10% 90% -14% 95% -13% 97% -11% 91% -10% 
Single Female 74 -12 76 -11 78 -10 74 -9 89 -13 94 -12 95 -11 88 -10 
Married Single-Earner 86 -15 85 -14 90 -13 84 -12 103 -16 106 -16 110 -14 101 -13 
Married Dual-Earners 76 -13 71 -12 82 -12 81 -12 91 -14 89 -14 101 -13 98 -13 
Real Rate of Return 2.0% and Annuity Rate Reduced 10%                 
Single Male 85 -2 86 -3 86 -4 80 -5 101 -3 104 -4 103 -5 95 -7 
Single Female 84 -2 84 -3 84 -4 78 -5 100 -3 103 -3 101 -5 93 -6 
Married Single-Earner 100 -1 97 -1 99 -3 92 -4 118 -1 119 -2 120 -4 110 -4 
Married Dual-Earners 88 -1 82 -1 91 -3 90 -4 104 -1 101 -2 110 -4 107 -4 
Real Rate of Return 2.8% and Annuity Rate Increased 10%                 
Single Male 90 +3 92 +3 95 +4 92 +6 107 +3 112 +4 113 +5 109 +8 
Single Female 88 +2 90 +3 93 +4 89 +6 105 +3 110 +4 111 +5 105 +7 
Married Single-Earner 101 +1 100 +2 106 +4 100 +4 120 +1 123 +2 128 +4 119 +5 
Married Dual-Earners 89 +1 85 +2 98 +4 98 +4 105 +1 104 +2 118 +4 116 +5 
Progressive Indexation of Social Security Benefits (Beginning in 2012)               
Single Male 82 -5 81 -8 84 -6 80 -5 98 -6 99 -9 100 -8 94 -8 
Single Female 81 -5 80 -7 82 -6 77 -6 97 -6 97 -9 98 -8 91 -8 
Married Single-Earner 94 -7 88 -10 93 -9 86 -10 112 -7 108 -13 112 -12 103 -11 
Married Dual-Earners 88 -1 81 -2 89 -5 87 -7 104 -1 99 -4 108 -6 104 -7 
28% Across-the-Board Cut in Social Security Benefits                   
Single Male 68 -19 71 -18 76 -15 73 -13 80 24 86 -22 89 -19 84 -17 
Single Female 66 -20 70 -17 74 -15 69 -14 79 -23 84 -22 87 -19 82 -16 
Married Single-Earner 74 -26 74 -24 83 -19 79 -17 87 -32 91 -30 100 -24 94 -20 
Married Dual-Earners 65 -23 63 -20 76 -18 77 -17 77 -27 77 -25 92 -22 92 -19 
Source: Author’s calculation 
1 Other than changed assumptions, all other assumptions as in baseline simulation. 
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 Table 5: Accumulation Results from Stochastic Simulations 
      SINGLE  MARRIED 
    Earnings Path Earnings Path 
      HS-35K Col-55K Grad-75K
Scaled 
Grad-100K HS-35K Col-55K Grad-75K
Scaled 
Grad-100K
 Balance at the end of 2032 (2006$) 
Investment Account1   
 Expected Value $113,679 $276,301 $653,018 $967,434 $  35,060 $129,342 $499,425 $739,889
 By Decile           
  Top 216,736 526,857 1,394,984 2,066,643 56,896 228,518 1,013,163 1,500,983
  Middle 104,249 253,369 575,095 851,993 33,495 121,112 449,302 665,633
  Bottom 54,851 133,305 263,562 390,462 20,521 68,513 219,223 324,775
              
Baseline Case2 77,709 188,867 377,704 559,562 28,245 96,160 313,481 464,417
Difference between Investment Account1 and Baseline Case2 (percent)       
Investment Account1         
 Expected Value 46.3% 46.3% 72.9% 72.9% 24.1% 34.5% 59.3% 59.3%
 By Decile            
  Top 178.9 179.0 269.3 269.3 101.4 137.6 223.2 223.2
  Middle 34.2 34.2 52.3 52.3 18.6 25.9 43.3 43.3
  Bottom -29.4 -29.4 -30.2 -30.2 -27.3 -28.8 -30.1 -30.1
Percent of Simulations where Baseline Case2 Accumulates More Assets Than Investment Account1   
Percent of Simulations 21.5% 21.5% 17.6% 17.6% 27.6% 24.4% 19.2% 19.2%
Source: Author’s calculation 
1 Assumes savings are invested in portfolio that is 50-percent stocks and 50-percent bonds.  Five-thousand stochastic simulations are run assuming real returns 
after investment expenses are drawn from a distribution of returns with mean and standard deviation equal to historical experience (5.2% mean, 12.8% standard 
deviation); inflation rates taken from history and Social Security Administration’s Intermediate projection.   
 2 Assumes savings are invested in inflation-indexed bond earning 2.4% real; inflation rates taken from history and Social Security Administration’s Intermediate 
projection.   
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 Table 6:  
Comparison of Present Discounted Value1 of Annuity, TIPS Portfolio, and Investment Account 
($100,000 investment at age 66; payout age 67 to 100) 
Option 
PDV of 
Withdrawal
PDV of 
Bequest
PDV of 
Total 
Payments
Years of 
Shortfall 
Weighted by 
Probability 
Alive
PDV of 
Shortfall 
Conditional 
on Shortfall
Male 
Real Immediate Life Annuity2 $73,438 $0 $73,438 0.0 $0
TIPS Portfolio3 66,658 33,342 100,000 15.6 6,719
Investment Account3,4 
   Expected Value 84,424 45,147 129,572 2.0 923
      Top Decile 137,168 79,277 216,445 1.1 199
      Middle Decile 80,854 42,555 123,409 2.6 1,367
      Bottom Decile 50,129 24,212 74,341 15.6 23,248
Female 
Real Immediate Life Annuity2 $76,112 $0 $76,112 0.0 $0
TIPS Portfolio3 70,214 29,786 100,000 17.7 5,700
Investment Account3,4 
   Expected Value 92,645 42,968 135,612 2.6 872
      Top Decile 157,577 80,105 237,682 1.0 366
      Middle Decile 87,941 40,083 128,024 2.8 1,045
      Bottom Decile 52,165 21,294 73,460 18.2 23,746
Married Couple 
Real Immediate Life Annuity2 $69,079 $0 $69,079 0.0 $0
TIPS Portfolio3 83,614 16,386 100,000 9.4 2,551
Investment Account3,4 
   Expected Value 111,404 26,810 138,215 0.2 88
      Top Decile 192,057 55,643 247,700 0.0 1
      Middle Decile 105,483 24,362 129,845 0.4 145
      Bottom Decile 61,587 11,164 72,750 14.1 11,867
Source: Author's calculation 
1 PDV at time of purchase. Takes into account both probability alive and time cost of money, using nominal interest rate of 
5.2%: 2.8% inflation plus 2.4% real. 
2 Pays amount that increases with inflation until death.  For married individuals, pays ½ the total payment if one spouse 
dies. There are no payments upon death.  Pricing for annuity taken from Vanguard’s annuity website on October 31, 2006.  
Life expectancy in 2033 at age 67 expected to equal life expectancy in 2006 at age 65; inflation rates taken from Social 
Security Administration’s Intermediate Projection.   
3 Assumes investment account that annually pays out 1/E[T] of the account balance, where E[T] is life expectancy 
conditional on age; upon death, account balance is left to heirs.  Life expectancy in 2033 at age 67 expected to equal life 
expectancy in 2006 at age 65.  
4 Account invested in portfolio that is 50-percent stocks and 50-percent bonds.  Five-thousand stochastic simulation are run 
assuming real returns after investment expenses are drawn from a distribution of returns with mean and standard deviation 
equal to historical experience (5.2% mean, 12.8% standard deviation); inflation rates taken from Social Security 
Administration’s Intermediate Projection.    
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 Table 7: 
Replacement Rates for Single Individuals from Baseline Case1 and Stochastic Simulations2 
      Earnings Path 
  HS-35K Col-55K Grad-75K 
Scaled 
Grad-100K
Single Male Renters 
Baseline Case1 87% 89% 90% 86%
Investment Account2 
Expected Value 98 106 119 118
Top Decile 126 139 194 203
Middle Decile 95 102 110 108
Bottom Decile 81 83 84 79
Single Male Homeowners 
Baseline Case1 104% 108% 108% 101%
Investment Account2 
Expected Value 117 128 142 139
Top Decile 150 169 232 240
Middle Decile 114 124 132 128
Bottom Decile 97 101 100 93
Percent of Simulations where PDV Withdrawals Greater for Investment Account 
Percent of Simulations 79% 79% 83% 83%
Single Female Renters 
Baseline Case1 86% 87% 89% 83%
Investment Account2 
Expected Value 97 104 117 115
Top Decile 125 139 192 200
Middle Decile 94 100 109 106
Bottom Decile 80 81 82 77
Single Female Homeowners 
Baseline Case1 102% 106% 106% 98%
Investment Account2 
Expected Value 116 127 140 136
Top Decile 149 169 229 237
Middle Decile 112 122 130 125
    Bottom Decile 96 99 98 91
Percent of Simulations where PDV Withdrawals Greater for Investment Account 
Percent of Simulations 79% 79% 83% 83%
1 Pays amount that increases with inflation until death. There are no payments upon death.  Pricing for annuity taken 
from Vanguard’s annuity website on October 31, 2006.  Life expectancy in 2033 at age 67 expected to equal life 
expectancy in 2006 at age 65; inflation rates taken from Social Security Administration’s Intermediate Projection. 
2 Assumes investment account that annually pays out 1/E[T] of the account balance, where E[T] is life expectancy 
conditional on age; upon death, account balance is left to heirs.  Life expectancy in 2033 at age 67 expected to equal 
life expectancy in 2006 at age 65.  Account invested in portfolio that is 50-percent stocks and 50-percent bonds.  
Five-thousand stochastic simulation are run assuming real returns after investment expenses are drawn from a 
distribution of returns with mean and standard deviation equal to historical experience (5.2% mean, 12.8% standard 
deviation); inflation rates taken from Social Security Administration’s Intermediate Projection.     
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 Table 8: 
Replacement Rates for Married Couples from Baseline Case1 and Stochastic Simulations2 
      Earnings Path 
  HS-35K Col-55K Grad-75K 
Scaled Grad-
100K
Single-Earner Married Couple Renters 
Baseline Case1 101% 99% 103% 96%
Investment Account2 
Expected Value 104 107 127 122
Top Decile 111 124 173 173
Middle Decile 103 105 122 117
Bottom Decile 100 96 99 93
Single-Earner Married Couple Homeowners 
Baseline Case1 119% 121% 124% 115%
Investment Account2 
Expected Value 123 131 154 145
Top Decile 131 153 210 207
Middle Decile 122 129 148 140
Bottom Decile 118 118 120 111
Dual-Earner Married Couple Renters 
Baseline Case1 88% 83% 94% 94%
Investment Account2 
Expected Value 91 91 119 120
Top Decile 98 109 166 171
Middle Decile 91 90 114 115
Bottom Decile 87 81 90 91
Dual-Earner Married Homeowners 
Baseline Case1 104% 102% 114% 112%
Investment Account2 
Expected Value 108 112 143 143
Top Decile 116 134 201 204
Middle Decile 107 110 138 137
Bottom Decile 103 99 109 108
Percent of Simulations where PDV Withdrawals Greater for Investment Account 
Percent of Simulations 84% 85% 87% 87%
1 Pays amount that increases with inflation until death. Pays ½ the total payment if one spouse dies. There are no 
payments upon death.  Pricing for annuity taken from Vanguard’s annuity website on October 31, 2006.  Life 
expectancy in 2033 at age 67 expected to equal life expectancy in 2006 at age 65; inflation rates taken from Social 
Security Administration’s Intermediate Projection. 
2 Assumes investment account that annually pays out 1/E[T] of the account balance, where E[T] is the average life 
expectancy for men and women conditional on age.  Payments continue until both spouses die; upon death of both 
spouses, account balance is left to heirs.  Life expectancy in 2033 at age 67 expected to equal life expectancy in 
2006 at age 65. Account invested in portfolio that is 50-percent stocks and 50-percent bonds.  Five-thousand 
stochastic simulation are run assuming real returns after investment expenses are drawn from a distribution of 
returns with mean and standard deviation equal to historical experience (5.2% mean, 12.8% standard deviation); 
inflation rates taken from Social Security Administration’s Intermediate Projection. 
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Table 9: 
Replacement Rates for Married Survivors from Baseline Case1 and Stochastic Simulations2 
      Earnings Path 
  HS-35K Col-55K Grad-75K 
Scaled Grad-
100K
Single-Earner Married Survivor Renters 
Baseline Case1 66% 64% 64% 59%
Investment Account2 
Expected Value 72 77 95 93
Top Decile 81 96 151 157
Middle Decile 71 75 90 86
Bottom Decile 67 65 69 64
Single-Earner Married Survivor Homeowners 
Baseline Case1 78% 79% 77% 71%
Investment Account2 
Expected Value 85 95 115 111
Top Decile 96 118 183 187
Middle Decile 84 92 109 102
Bottom Decile 79 80 83 77
Dual-Earner Married Survivor Renters 
Baseline Case1 44% 42% 48% 47%
Investment Account2 
Expected Value 50 55 80 83
Top Decile 59 73 137 147
Middle Decile 49 53 73 75
    Bottom Decile 45 43 51 52
Dual-Earner Married Survivor Homeowners 
Baseline Case1 52% 51% 57% 56%
Investment Account2 
Expected Value 58 67 96 99
Top Decile 69 90 166 175
Middle Decile 57 64 88 90
    Bottom Decile 53 52 62 62
Percent of Simulations where PDV Withdrawals Greater for Investment Account 
Percent of Simulations 98% 98% 98% 98%
1 Pays amount that increases with inflation until death. Pays ½ the total payment if one spouse dies. There are no 
payments upon death.  Pricing for annuity taken from Vanguard’s annuity website on October 31, 2006.  Life 
expectancy in 2033 at age 67 expected to equal life expectancy in 2006 at age 65; inflation rates taken from Social 
Security Administration’s Intermediate Projection. 
2 Assumes investment account that annually pays out 1/E[T] of the account balance, where E[T] is the average life 
expectancy for men and women conditional on age.  Payments continue until both spouses die; upon death of both 
spouses, account balance is left to heirs.  Life expectancy in 2033 at age 67 expected to equal life expectancy in 
2006 at age 65. Account invested in portfolio that is 50-percent stocks and 50-percent bonds.  Five-thousand 
stochastic simulation are run assuming real returns after investment expenses are drawn from a distribution of 
returns with mean and standard deviation equal to historical experience (5.2% mean, 12.8% standard deviation); 
inflation rates taken from Social Security Administration’s Intermediate Projection. 
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Figure 1: Representative Earnings Paths
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Figure 2: Real Annuity Payouts Compared to TIPS Portfolio Payouts
(annual payment/withdrawal, conditional on survival, $100,000 investment)
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